Abstract-A theoretical framework for the use of multiple linear approximations in the linear cryptanalysis of block ciphers is given. The covariance of two mask counts is derived, and it is shown that under appropriate conditions the mask counts in linear cryptanalysis are stochastically independent, whether or not the masks are linearly independent. Some consequences of these observations are also considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
The technique of linear cryptanalysis [6] where a is the data (plaintext-ciphertext) mask and a y is the key mask.
If the probability p 6 = 1 2 , then the linear approximation can be used to give an estimate of one bit of key information.
It is obviously natural to consider using more than one such linear approximation [3] , [4] , [10] , though there are of course many other methods of generalizing linear cryptanalysis [7] , [5] , [2] , [11] . In particular, it has been noted for some time that using a larger (linearly) dependent set of masks can give a more powerful analysis than just using the smaller linearly independent basis of these masks [4] . Such an analysis for the DES [8] was reported at CRYPTO 2004 [1] . We give a theoretical framework for this observation and use this framework to give theoretical results about linear cryptanalysis. In particular, we show that the covariance of two mask counts is proportional to the bias of the sum of the two masks, so that counts for linearly dependent masks can be considered as stochastically independent in some fairly general circumstances likely to exist in cryptanalysis. This allows us to demonstrate that linear independence of masks and the stochastic independence of mask counts are entirely unrelated concepts, in contradiction to a seemingly widely held belief. Furthermore, we discuss some statistical issues related to estimating the key in linear cryptanalysis and show that the theoretical analysis given in [1] is incorrect.
II. A SMALL EXAMPLE
We begin by discussing a small example in order to illustrate simply some of the issues discussed in Section I. Suppose we have two linearly independent data masks a T 01 and a T 10 (so a 01 6 = a 10 ). where 1 = (1; 1; 1; 1) T and d = (d00; d01; d10; d11) T [9] . Suppose now that we have N plaintext-ciphertext pairs, then we can define
Mult (N; 2 02 (1 + d));
so W is a random variable giving the counts for each data class (j; l).
We can now consider the linear approximations defined by the masks a01 and a10. We can define the two "mask" random variables for the If we define e jl = 1 2 (d 00 + d jl )((j; l) 6 = (0; 0)), then these random variables are binomial random variables [9] , with distributions given by Thus e jl is a measure of the difference from the uniform probability of the linear approximation defined by mask a jl , and is twice the bias [6] of the linear approximation, termed the imbalance in [1] . (1 + e01) and 1 2 (1 + e 10 ) respectively, whilst the variances are Thus the covariance of V For normal random variables, zero covariance (diagonal covariance matrix) implies stochastic independence. Thus if e11 is small, then it may be possible to regard the mask counts V 01 and V 10 as "approximately" stochastically independent. Conversely, if e11 are large, then the mask counts are not stochastically independent.
Suppose now we define a third mask a 11 = a 01 + a 10 . Clearly, the three masks are not linearly independent. We can define a random variable We now consider the mask count for the mask a11 over N plaintextciphertext pairs. This is given by the random variable V 11 , where 
III. INDEPENDENCE OF MASK COUNTS
We generalize and abstract the above example and consider m masks spanning an l-dimensional subspace in this section, in order to discuss the stochastic independence of mask counts. This discussion of multiple linear approximations is given in terms of the underlying data classes, building on a theoretical approach given in [7] . Furthermore, suppose we express the probability that data class x oc- Suppose now that we have N plaintext-ciphertext pairs, then we can define
so W is a random variable giving the counts for each data class x.
Having considered the distribution for the underlying data classes, we now turn to the distribution for the masks. Any mask a defines a hyperplane H r = fu 2 l 2 jr T a u = 0g, that is a plane of dimension l01 in l 2 . We can define the vector tr of length 2 l to be the indicator vector for the hyperplane H r . Thus half the entries of t r are 1 and half 0, so t T r 1 = 2 l01 and we have t T r t r = H r H r = 2 l01 t r = t r 2 l02 t r 6 = t r :
We define T to be the m 2 2 l matrix with rows t r , so T is a par- A common situation in linear cryptanalysis is that the imbalances e r are very small, so we may disregard the matrix 1 as being negligible when compared with I . In this situation, the joint distribution of the mask counts V is given by The obvious striking feature of this distribution is that the covariance matrix of the mask counts V is proportional to the identity matrix.
Thus the components of V, namely the individual mask counts, are independent. This result is summarized in the following theorem. We have also demonstrated that the only factors in determining the stochastic independence of mask counts are the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and the size of the imbalances. Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The stochastic independence of mask counts and the linear (algebraic) independence of the masks are entirely unrelated concepts.
IV. GOODNESS-OF-FIT TECHNIQUES
We now consider how the methodology of the well-known 2 goodness-of-fit test for the multinomial distribution can be applied within this cryptographic framework, and our discussion closely follows the standard justification for this test [9] . This enables us firstly to give a more formal derivation of the above distributional result and secondly to consider some consequences for linear cryptanalysis. Some related discussion of the use of the 2 distribution in linear cryptanalysis has also been given in [10] .
We begin this discussion by more clearly stating the assumptions underlying linear cryptanalysis. Each key has its own associated vector d of differences from uniform probability and hence its own associated random Thus the hypothesis that _ e = e 3 can be tested by comparing empirical values of the above quadratic form Q with a 2 distribution with m degrees of freedom. The power of such a test is given by m (degrees of freedom) and the noncentrality parameter. Such a test and the related distributions are given directly by the theory of large sample likelihood ratio tests [9] .
We noted in Section III that in many cryptanalytic situations the ma- We conclude this section with a remark about the number N of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. We clearly require that N be large enough so that above distributional results are applicable. Thus we require each underlying data class to occur reasonably often. However, the data classes are very roughly equiprobable (small dx) and a comparison with the related
V. KEY CLASS ESTIMATES
We recall that we have partitioned the key space into key classes, and the aim of the analysis is to estimate the true key class z 3 , that is the key class containing the true key. We now discuss how to use the distributional information of Section IV to estimate the true key class z 3 . Without loss of generality, we assume that the matrix 1 is negligible. It is in any case a simple matter to include it in the following discussion.
For each key class z, there is a corresponding 2 l -vector e of differences from uniform probability (2 0l ) of the linear approximations for that key classes. With a slight abuse of notation, we let Z denote the set of all such key classes z or equivalently the set of all corresponding vectors e where appropriate. The best (maximum likelihood) estimatê z for the true key class is the key class corresponding to the best estimate of the vector e within Z. The argument of the previous section demonstrates that, for small e, this is given by min _ e2Z N jê 0 _ ej
:
This quadratic minimization for the best estimate of the key class can also be derived directly from the likelihood function for the mask counts under the assumption of the independence of mask counts [1] . Previous research has given measures for the effectiveness of a collection of linear approximations [3] , [4] , [10] , [1] . These are usually related to what is termed the capacity in Thus the capacity is related to the largest noncentrality parameter. In the case where there are only two key classes, the capacity is proportional to the noncentrality parameter. The capacity gives a measure of the maximum difference between distributions for the true key class and any other class, or equivalently capacity is a measure of the difference between the distributions for the true key class and the worse key class. Some research [3] , [4] , [10] has considered finding the key class by taking an appropriate linear combination of the mask counts. In the language of this paper, this is equivalent to defining a unit (without loss of generality) vector u and considering the random variable This random variable can be analyzed directly [3] , [4] or the related which has a noncentral 2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom and noncentrality parameter N ju T (e 3 0 _ e)j 2 . Under the hypothesis that _ e 6 = e 3 , we need to choose u to maximize this noncentrality parameter that is to maximize u T (e 3 0 _ e). Clearly such a u is a unit vector in the direction e 3 0 _ e, when the noncentrality parameter for this noncentral 2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom is given by N je 3 0 _ ej
where _ e is the noncentrality parameter for the 2 distribution with m degrees of freedom discussed above. If there are more than two key classes, this noncentrality parameter can take many values depending on _ e, but is maximized by max_ e _ e . In the case discussed above where the jth imbalance is given by 6c j , the maximal noncentrality parameter for this 2 1 random variable is proportional to the capacity. The parameter given in [3] , [4] , [10] for the effectiveness of a collection of linear approximations is the sum of squared biases. In this case, this is 4 j c 2 j , which is four times the capacity and so proportional to the noncentrality parameter.
Capacity though does not always give the full picture. Capacity clearly cannot directly address the issue of "neighboring" key classes to the true key class when there are more than two key classes. Furthermore, the sole use of capacity in determining the effectiveness of a collection of linear approximations would suggest that there is never a role for linear approximations which have zero imbalance. However, the sampling distribution for the quadratic form has two parameters. The noncentrality parameter is related to the capacity and the number of degrees of freedom m is given by the number of masks. This indicates that the number of masks (even for the same capacity) may also be important factor. When we test whether _ e = e 3 using m masks, we are in fact testing whether _ d lies in a particular coset (containing d 3 ) of a subspace of dimension (2 l 0 1) 0 property (membership of a coset). We note that this observation does not directly relate to finding the maximum likelihood estimate of the key class which is a comparative process and does not directly involve the sampling distribution. However, this observation may have some relevance if we have to estimate the probability that a key class is the true key class, for example to establish some type of key ranking threshold.
VI. TRANSFORM METHODS
The use of transforms which are defined as the expectation of a function of the random variable is widespread in probability and statistics. where for completeness we define the "null" imbalance e0 to be 1 and R is the m2l matrix used to define the mask set given in Section III. For the components of V (i) to be mutually stochastically independent, we would require 9 V to factorize into its component transforms. This Biryukov et al. in their CRYPTO 2004 paper [1] give results for experiments using multiple linear approximations for the analysis of the DES [8] . The experiments find the key class using the form of the log-likelihood given above. In [1] , the log-likelihood is derived under the assumption of the probabilistic independence of different masks counts, and a justification for this assumption is given in [1, Section 3.4] . This justification is the basis of the entire theoretical analysis of multiple linear approximations given by [1] , yet, as we now discuss, it is fallacious.
The justification given in [1] concentrates on the mask counts for an individual plaintext-ciphertext pair, and "shows" such mask counts are independent. Clearly, as the example of Section II shows, such a set of mask counts cannot be independent. The justification gives a version of the above expression that gives the imbalances in terms of the Walsh-Hadamard transform of the probability vector for the mask counts, and then inverts this transform to give a probability vector for the mask counts as a Walsh-Hadamard transform of the imbalances. However, the Walsh-Hadamard inversion given in [1] is not correct. It ignores both the maximal null imbalance e 0 and the restrictions given by the linear dependencies of the masks. Thus the probabilities given for V (i) are highly erroneous. First, a constant 2 0l is omitted, and second, positive probabilities are assigned to events that cannot occur. The sum given in the inverse transform is then approximated by a product (with the null imbalance re-included) to give in our terminology where fj is the jth standard basis vector. This expression is incorrect as it assigns significant positive probability to events with probability zero (see the example of Section II), so this product form is just not correct. Furthermore, even when we have no dependent masks, so all events have positive probability, the expression is not correct. It is then stated that: "Apart from an irrelevant constant factor of 2 m01 , this is exactly what we need: it implies that even with dependent masks, we can still multiply probabilities as we did to obtain [an expression for the joint probability of mask counts over N plaintext-ciphertext pairs]." This assertion is simply incorrect. Thus not only does this probability for an individual plaintext-ciphertext not have the above product form, but the method given for combining probabilities is also invalid.
The justification given in [1] for the stochastic independence of mask counts is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, stochastic independence for mask counts is essentially a large-sample (central limit) property (see Section III), so any reasoning based on one plaintext-ciphertext pair, such as that of [1] , ignores the fundamental issue. Second, the justification given in [1] asserts the independence of mask counts for moderately large imbalances, but such mask counts can be far from independent (see Section II).
VII. CONCLUSION
We have given a theoretical analysis of linear cryptanalysis based on standard statistical theory. This has enabled us to handle multiple linear approximations in a systematic manner and so have a consistent method of finding the true key class based on well-known statistical techniques. This theoretical approach has also led to new results about multiple linear approximations and highlighted severe shortcomings in the theoretical approach in other research. the vector of data class probabilities. This distribution depends on two symmetric 2 l 22 l matrices B and P which satisfy PBP = B [9] . The matrix B is the information matrix and is given for a multinomial distribution by the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries (2 0l (1+d 3 x )) 01 . As B is a diagonal matrix, we define the matrix B to be the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries (2 where Y 2 N(0; I) is a vector of 2 l independent standard normal (N(0; 1)) random variables [9] . This distributional form is used to give the 2 goodness-of-fit statistic for a multinomial distribution, namely the quadratic form N2 02l ( The calculation of an entry in this covariance matrix is given by the calculation for Cov(V We recall from Section III that R is an m 2l matrix given by (IjQ T ) T . We can define an m 2(m0l) matrix R by R = (0jI) T , so the m 2m However, S1 is a vector 1 of length l, so s 0T (S1) gives the parity of s 0 . We, therefore, define (s 0 ) = (01) s (S1) , so 
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